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ABSTRACT
Recent adjustments by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department
of Transportation (DOT) to their cost-benefit analysis procedures could cause
tremendous changes to federal regulation. For decades, federal agencies have calculated
the value of a statistical life (VSL) and have used that number when evaluating the costs
and benefits of proposed regulations. If a regulation was expected to save lives, the number
of lives saved could be multiplied by the VSL to monetize the benefits. Because, however,
lives saved in the future were given the same nominal value as lives saved in the present, the
real value of future lives was substantially eroded by discounting to present value,
generally at annual rates of 3 and 7 percent. In other words, if a life saved today is worth
$8 million, a life saved in ten or twenty years would be worth far less. A discount rate of
7 percent erodes half the value of a life expected to be saved in 2022 and three-quarters
of one expected to be saved in 2032. this process hinders the regulation of slow-acting
perils, such as workplace carcinogens and global climate change.
Now the EPA and the DOT have begun inflating VSLs when calculating the benefits
of regulations. Before subjecting lifesaving benefits to the same discounting applied to
other costs and benefits, the agencies adjust the values upward to reflect the expected
higher income (and associated willingness to pay to avoid risks of harm) enjoyed by
future persons. this seemingly minor procedural change can radically alter the expected
benefits of major regulations, and the regulated community will likely oppose the agencies'
efforts to more accurately calculate future benefits. Observers of federal regulation should
track this battle carefully and contact other federal agencies as they decide whether to
adopt the "VSL inflation" procedure.
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Without much fanfare, at least two federal agencies-the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-
have recently made changes to their cost-benefit analysis procedures. The
changes are technical and may not seem especially exciting, even to those
predisposed to read regulatory impact analyses. But they have the potential to
affect substantive regulations important to every American, covering matters
as varied as vehicle emissions standards, water pollution limits, airline flight
crew rest requirements, transportation of radioactive waste, and pesticide use.
The procedural changes have such broad effects because they alter a calcu-
lation at the heart of regulations protecting the environment and human
safety: the value of human life. Because many regulations are designed to
save lives, the value assigned to life largely determines expected regulatory
benefits, a projection that influences the robustness of a proposed regula-
tion and the likelihood of its eventual enactment.1
Put simply, the DOT and the EPA have changed their methods of
calculating the values of human lives expected to be saved by regulations.
Until recently, pursuant to the standard practice in the executive branch, both
agencies valued a life saved in the future as equal to a life saved today.2 Because
future costs and benefits of regulations were discounted to their present value,
however, the practical effect of this nominal equality was that future lives
were worth less than current lives, and the further into the future a life was
projected to be saved, the less importance was given to the life when weighing
the costs and benefits of a proposed regulation.3 For example, if a workplace
safety regulation would decrease worker contact with a certain carcinogen, the
expected benefit (preventing worker cancer deaths) would be discounted to its
present value based on when the prevented deaths otherwise would have
occurred. Assuming an annual discount rate of 3 percent, a life saved in 2022
would be deemed about three-quarters as valuable as one saved today,4 while a
1. Federal law requires agencies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis before promulgating major
regulations, and assigning a value to saved lives is essential to setting a monetary value on the
benefits of lifesaving regulations. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Ben ft
Analysis, and the Discounting ofHuman Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 955-57 (1999).
2. See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Ben ftAnalysis ofEnvironmental
Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2002).
3. See Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting... on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 131-35 (2007).
4. The present value (PV) of a future benefit is given by the formula PV = FV/(1 + r)', where FV
represents future value, r represents the annual discount rate, and n represents the number of years
into the future that the benefit will be received. Thus, assuming a 3 percent discount rate, a future
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life saved in 2032 would be deemed about 55 percent as valuable as a 2012 life.
Because the costs of regulations tend to be borne up front, though their benefits
are not enjoyed until later, discounting tends to lower the expected net benefits of
lifesaving regulation.6 In practice, these results are even more distorted by
the use of high discount rates. The commonly used discount rate of 7 percent7
yields present valuations of roughly one-half the benefits expected ten years in
the future, and just one quarter of the benefits expected in twenty years8
To find the value of a life saved today-that is, before any discounting-
agencies rely on economic calculations of the "value of a statistical life,"
commonly known as a VSL.9 These calculations generally rely on assessments
of observed willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid fatal risks and willingness to
accept (WTA) such risks in exchange for money. For example, if dangerous
jobs come with a wage premium, then the premium can be multiplied by the
risk to find the worker's valuation of his own life. If a job with a one-in-one-
thousand annual death risk pays $5000 more per year than a comparable
job without the risk, the theory provides that the workers at the dangerous job
exhibit a willingness to accept the risk in exchange for the premium.10 The
benefit with a value of x carries a present value of x * (1/1.030), or 0.744x, if expected ten years
from now. The discount rate takes into account the time-value of money, allowing someone to
decide how valuable a dollar today is compared to a future dollar. With a discount rate of
5 percent, for example, the present value of a dollar promised to arrive in one year is 95.2 cents,
and that same dollar scheduled to arrive in two years is worth 90.7 cents today. The discount rate
is determined in part by the expected rate of inflation and the expected return on investments.
5. The equation is 1/1.03" = 0.554.
6. For example, a power plant required to install scrubbers to reduce toxic emissions would pay for the
equipment long before any health benefits would be observed in communities near its smokestacks.
7. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis 31, 34 (2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf ("For regu-
latory analysis, you should provide estimates of net benefits using both 3 percent and 7 percent.").
8. The equations are: 1/(1.07 0) = 0.508 and 1/(1.07-") = 0.258. Note that benefits accruing in ten or
twenty years are by no means unusual. A regulation, for example, that prevents children from
consuming lead dust will provide benefits for the entire lives of the children protected. See U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING LEAD IN GASOLINE: FINAL
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (1985) [hereinafter REDUCING LEAD].
9. See, e.g., Proximity Detection Systems for Continuous Mining Machines in Underground Coal
Mines, 76 Fed. Reg. 54163, 54174 (Aug. 31, 2011) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 75); Lewis A.
Komhauser, The Value ofLife, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 209 (1990); W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of
Risks to Life andHealth, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1912 (1993).
10. The potential flaws of this process-such as the assumption that workers know the salaries of
colleagues and of workers at rival firms or the precise dangerousness of various worksites-are too
numerous to discuss here. For purposes of this Essay, it will suffice to report that VSL figures
obtained in part on the basis of such willingness to pay and willingness to accept data are
commonly used by federal agencies. See, e.g., Cranes and Derricks in Construction, 75 Fed. Reg.
47906, 48095 (Aug. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1926) (reporting that agency
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resulting VSL equals one thousand multiplied by $5000, or $5 million.11
In July 2011, however, DOT officials issued a memorandum titled
"Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical Life in Departmental
Analysis. 2 In addition to setting forth the agency's VSL for subsequent regu
latory impact analyses, the document states, "[W]e will now forecast higher future
VSL in response to expected income growth." 3 The new forecast procedure
was explained as follows:
In the revised guidance published on February 5, 2008, we adopted an
income elasticity of 0.55 for adjusting past VSL to current values,
but we did not use it to estimate anticipated VSL resulting from
expected growth in real income levels. Since higher incomes should
be reflected in willingness to pay for reduced risk, logical consistency
requires that this income adjustment be incorporated in estimates of
future as well as past and present VSL.14
In other words, the DOT had previously used income growth data to
update old VSL numbers, allowing the agency to use more accurate values
without waiting for new studies. For example, if a 2000 study set the VSL at
$5 million, a regulatory impact analysis prepared in 2005 might use a VSL
of, say, $5.2 million. Under the new regime, the DOT will apply this reasoning
to future lives. Accordingly, if a 2012 regulatory impact analysis predicts that a
proposed rule would save a life in 2017, then the value of the future life would
be increased from today's VSL by an appropriate annual multiplier. The DOT
memorandum announced a present VSL of $6.2 million, meaning a life saved
five years in the future would be worth almost $6.5 million. 6 The adjusted
figure would then be discounted to its present value at the usual discount
rates. In the past, discounting was performed on future lives assigned today's
value, without any upward adjustment, and that practice remains standard at
most agencies.
"estimated monetized benefits for avoiding fatalities (the value of a statistical life, or VSL) or
injuries (a value based on willingness to pay)").
11. If a worker is willing to exchange $5000 for a 1/1000 chance of dying, the theory provides that
the worker values 1/1000 of her life at $5000.
12. POLLY TROTTENBERG & ROBERT S. RIVKIN, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TREATMENT OF
THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF A STATISTICAL LIFE IN DEPARTMENTAL ANALYSIS, (July




15. The DOT Memorandum announces an "annual VSL growth factor" of 1.00877. Id at 2 & n.3.
Accordingly, a statistical life worth $5 million today would be worth $5 million * 1.00877', or
about $5.22 million, in five years.
16. The equation is $6.2 million * (1.00877') = $6.477 million.
As noted in the DOT Memorandum, the EPA has recently adopted a sim-
ilar procedure.17 In guidance issued to EPA staff concerning economic analysis,
including cost-benefit analysis of proposed environmental regulation, the EPA
stated, "The review supports... adjusting VVTP estimates to account for higher
future income levels.""8 Because of the EPA's broad responsibilities, the guid-
ance applies to regulations issued pursuant to the Clean Water Act, the Clean
Air Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Toxic Substances
Control Act, and more than twenty additional statutes. 9
The EPA has put its guidance into practice, incorporating VSL inflation2"
in the cost-benefit analysis supporting the issuance of major regulations. In
September 2011, the EPA promulgated the "first-ever program to reduce
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and improve fuel efficiency of heavy-duty
trucks and buses."'2 Covering most trucks, buses, and vans, the standards are
"designed to address the urgent and closely intertwined challenges of depen-
dence on oil, energy security, and global climate change. 22 In the final regu
latory impact analysis supporting the regulation, the EPA stated that it had
inflated the values of future lives to account for rising incomes.23  The agency
17. DOT MEMORANDUM, supra note 12, at 2 n.2; see U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES
FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES, at App. B, 4-5 (2010) [hereinafter EPA
GUIDELINES], available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/pages/Gtidelines.htm ("[B]ene-
fits estimates of reduced mortality risk accruing in future years may be adjusted to reflect
anticipated income growth."); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1990-2010, H-39 (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/sect
812/1990-2010/chap1130.pdf (discussing the relationship between increased income and rising
willingness to pay to avoid risks).
18. EPA GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at B4.
19. For a list of statutes that the EPA is charged with administering, see Summaries ofEnvironmental
Lawvs and EOs, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/index-html (last
updated Jan. 27,2012).
20. The term "VSL inflation" was coined in Ben Trachtenberg, Health Injlation, Wealth Injlation, and
the Discounting of Human Life, 89 OR. L. REV. 1313, 1341 (2011). The artide, submitted to
journals before the issuance of the EPA Guidelines and published a few months before the DOT
Memorandum, noted that cost-benefit analysis (CBA) "calculators do not account for the growth
of GDP in excess of inflation and population growth" and called for agencies to indude "VSL
inflation into their CBA calculation process" to avoid "pervasive undercounting of benefits." Id. at
1334,1349,1355.
21. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA AND NHTSA ADOPT FIRST-EVER PROGRAM
TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND IMPROVE FUEL EFFICIENCY OF MEDIUM-
AND HEAVY-DUTY ENGINES AND VEHICLES 1 (2011) [hereinafter EPA FACT SHEET],
available at http://epa.gov/otaq/climate/documents/420f11031.pdf; see also Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and
Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15,2011).
22. EPA FACT SHEET, supra note 21, at 1.
23. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL RULEMAKING TO ESTABLISH GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS STANDARDS AND FUEL EFFICIENCY STANDARDS FOR MEDIUM- AND HEAVY-
DUTY ENGINES AND VEHICLES, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 8-96 (2011), available at
132 59 UCLA L. REV. Disc. 128 (2012)
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used the same procedure in drafting an August 2011 rule on ozone and fine parti-
culate emissions.24 Using an old VSL of $6.3 million, the EPA "account[ed] for
income growth to 2014" and found that, after "applying these adjustments to
the $6.3 million value [in 2000 dollars], the [resulting future] VSL is $8.7
million [in 2007 dollars]."25
The two agencies adopting VSL inflation procedures are especially
important actors in the valuation of human life for purposes of federal regulation.
The EPA's responsibilities require it to protect public health in a variety of
contexts, and we can expect to see similar calculations in EPA regulatory
impact analyses concerning wastewater management, 26 toxic substances, 27 and
solid waste.28  The DOT supervises several agencies whose missions include
issuing regulations to protect Americans from fatal risk. For example, the DOT
is composed of the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, and
others. 29 In addition, because these agencies have so much expertise in cost-
benefit analysis, their procedures and results are often adopted by other
regulators.3"
http://epa.gov/otaq/climate/documents/420rl1901.pdf. According to the regulatory impact
analysis, "All values are in constant year 2007 dollars, adjusted for growth in real income out to
2030 using projections provided by Standard and Poor's. Economic theory argues that [wil-
lingness to pay] for most goods (such as environmental protection) will increase if real income
increases." Id.
24. See Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone
and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,314 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 51).
25. Id. at 48,314 n.97.
26. Pursuant to the Clean Water Act, the EPA runs the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System permit program. See Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
27. The EPA's regulations under the Toxic Substances Control Act spawned one of the most famous
cases ofjudicial review of agency cost-benefit analysis. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947
F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (striking down an asbestos regulation).
28. For a squabble over the interstices of an EPA solid waste regulation, see American Petroleum
Institute v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (considering "sham recycling" under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act).
29. For regulations issued by these agencies whose benefits are measured in saved human lives, see, for
example, Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 330 (Jan. 4, 2012) (to
be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 117); Restrictions on Railroad Operating Employees' Use of Cellular
Telephones and Other Electronic Devices, 75 Fed. Reg. 27,672, 27,673 (May 18, 2010) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 220); Federal Motor Vehide Safety Standards; Child Restraint
Systems; Child Restraint Anchorage Systems, 64 Fed. Reg. 10,786 (Mar. 5, 1999) (to be codified at
49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
30. See, e.zf, Labeling for Bronchodilators to Treat Asthma; Cold, Cough, Allergy, Bronchodilator, and
Antiasthmatic Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use, 76 Fed. ReR. 44,475, 44,482 (July
26, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201) (Health & Human Services final rule stating,
"Estimated statistical lives saved are valued using Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)'s
value of a statistical life (VSL)").
Other regulatory agencies charged with protecting human life should
strongly consider implementing their own VSL inflation rules. As noted in the
DOT memorandum, if agencies inflate VSLs from old studies to determine
useful numbers for current analysis, "logical consistency requires that this
income adjustment be incorporated in estimates of future as well as past and
present VSL."31  More importantly, VSL inflation helps to counteract the
unreasonably high discount rates applied by federal agencies to future benefits.
Because the benefits of regulations tend to arrive well after their costs are incurred,
a high discount rate creates the appearance that otherwise sensible regulations
are not worth their price." This problem is especially acute when confronting
global climate change, the amelioration of which will yield benefits decades into
the future.
Cost-benefit analysis is a mandatory part of the regulatory process and
has been required by every president since Ronald Reagan.33 Federal law
charges agencies to "maximize net benefits,"34 and a pervasive undercounting
of benefits makes compliance impossible. Beyond legal compliance, underval-
uation of benefits has real-world consequences. If agencies undervalue the
benefits they are required to secure, then the public will receive fewer benefits.3"
When the benefits at issue are protection from fatal risks-for example,
respiratory illnesses caused by pollution, or deadly car crashes-the public pays
the ultimate price. Undervaluing life leads to death.
The new DOT and EPA procedures that incorporate inflation into fiture
VSLs will likely save lives. On the other hand, any procedure that tends to
increase the predicted net benefits of regulation invites attack from regulated
entities opposed to increased regulatory burdens.36 Every notice and comment
proceeding presents an opportunity for renewed objection to regulatory impact
analyses incorporating wealth inflation. A new presidential administration could
issue new memoranda and guidance instructing agencies to calculate benefits
without VSL inflation. This is a battle worth watching.
31. DOT MEMORANDUM, supra note 12, at 2.
32. See Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE
GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 144, 145 (Peter Laslett &James S. Fishkin eds., 1992); see also
REDUCING LEAD, supra note 8, at 1-23 ("Generally, the higher the discount rate, the lower the
net benefits, because costs usually are incurred sooner than benefits.").
33. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
34. Id. §1.
35. Seegenerally Cowen & Parfit, supra note 32, at 144-45,159.
36. See, e.g., Rena Steinzor & Michael Patoka, The Bottleneck, 29 ENVTL. FORUM 36 (Jan.-Feb. 2012),
available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/20120102 regweeksteinzor.pdf (critiquing the influence of
regulated entities and their lobbyists on decisions by the White House Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs).
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